IF THE assessments of the 2015 US National Military Strategy released last week serves as a weather vane, the Asia-Pacific region in coming years is heading for stronger and colder headwinds. They will cause unpredictable turbulence as the US is determined to promote and sustain its global leadership. Today, the US is not only up against Russia, the all-time adversary, but also the rising China, the all-weather player.
Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation July 6, 2015 1:00 am
IF THE assessments of the 2015 US National Military Strategy released last week serves as a weather vane, the Asia-Pacific region in coming years is heading for stronger and colder headwinds. They will cause unpredictable turbulence as the US is determined to promote and sustain its global leadership. Today, the US is not only up against Russia, the all-time adversary, but also the rising China, the all-weather player.
This emerging strategic chess game provides both challenges and opportunities for Asean to reflect deeply on its strength and weakness in engaging major powers.
According to the national security strategy, at the global level, the US will advance a rule-based international order that promotes peace, security through strong alliances and partnerships, forging diverse coalitions and leading in UN-related and other multilateral organisations.
For the Asia and Pacific region, the current rebalancing effort will be further strengthened through increased diplomacy, stronger alliances and partnerships, expanded trade and investment and a diverse security posture. It is a tall order, given existing domestic constraints inside the US and an unpredictable regional and global environment.
It is interesting to note that the latest US strategic thinking is directly in response to China’s assertive economic and security policies under President Xi Jinping, which have suddenly shaken existing regional and international orders. The establishment of a 57-member Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, with unusually strong backing from the West, was indicative of the current state of China vis-a-vis US economic influence throughout the world. It is a work in progress.
It remains to be seen how the ongoing US-China competition, euphorically known as a new type of relationship for major powers, will play out in the realms of security and strategy in the months and years to come. Make no mistake, the Asia and Pacific region will be the laboratory for their fierce contest.
Diplomatically speaking, Washington has often reiterated that it supports China’s peaceful rise and also encourages the country to become a partner for development and a broader global community. But at the same time, the US has also come out with strong rhetoric against Beijing, especially with Chinese claims in the South China Sea of being “inconsistent with international laws.”
With major powers upping the ante towards each other, it is a good opportunity for Asean to maintain its cool, in other word its centrality, to ascertain that the deep-root threat perceptions would not at any time break into open conflict or harm the grouping’s community building.
With the establishment of an Asean Regional Forum (ARF) in 1995, major powers, big and small, have used this Asean-led platform to exchange views, addressing their difference as well as attempting to eliminate trust deficits among 27 members. China has wisely utilised the ARF platform by supporting the Asean positions on regional and international issues. Together, they have managed to engage and shape the ARF consultative process in ways that strengthen their common positions as the ARF moves towards the preventive-building stage. Other Asean-led forums include the Asean Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit (EAS).
For Asean, the stakes are high as it moves toward one community at the end of 2015. Any rupture between the US-China relations would impact on its community-building and economic integration. From the Asean perspective, from now on US-China mutual mistrust would be further deepened as the pattern of confrontation and collaboration continued and diversified, but without opting for open conflict. Their cooperation at regional and international levels would be high on rhetoric but limited on action due to their different approaches and value systems.
At this point, with stronger US-China rivalry, Asean is moving quickly to consolidate its consultative process and structure as well as forging common security agenda at the highest level. Asean’s senior officials have agreed it is now the time to sharpen its role and focus on strategic matters at the EAS. In previous engagements, the Asean leaders were left very much to themselves to speak on issues of their concern. A lack of coordination and consultation among Asean members on key regional issues has weakened Asean centrality – with or without common voices.
So far, several recommendations have been made to improve Asean centrality in the EAS, including the setting of a Sherpa (software) system to coordinate views and agenda settings among the Asean leaders and their dialogue partners. A longer session focusing on exchange of views among leaders is being considered in addition to an informal retreat. Officially, they meet for three hours’ average and break out for bilateral summits. The EAS chair will have a stronger mandate to speak for Asean as a whole. The ongoing effort to review the EAS and promote the Asean centrality shows the grouping is more active and creative. It will be the showcase for Malaysia’s chairmanship later this year.
After 2011, the US and Russia joined the 10-member Asean, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand – transforming the EAS as the region’s most powerful leader-only region-wide strategic forum. The EU and Canada also wanted to join the EAS.
Of late, Russia has moved assertively, raising its profile by boosting ties with key Asean countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The ongoing sanctions by the West have prompted Russia to pursue the Asean-oriented pathway. Moscow is equally eager to shape and contribute to the regional architecture. Its Framework Principles of Strengthening Security and Developing Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific was taken up by an Asean working group and is waiting further deliberation.
It is clear only an Asean centrality that is stronger and strictly neutral can have far-reaching mitigating impacts on superpowers’ rivalry. The options are clear – Asean can stay ahead of the curve or be pushed into a dark alley as pawns
in the power struggle for influence and supremacy.
